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I. INTRODUCTION
Witness preparation is a staple of good trial practice for prosecutors.  A single 
ineffective or unprepared witness might imperil an otherwise airtight case.  
Interviewing witnesses before trial allows prosecutors to gauge the strength and 
factual basis of their case, determine the sequence of the presentation, and alert 
witnesses about evidentiary rules to prevent them from revealing prejudicial 
information.1  The failure to prepare witnesses could even violate a cardinal 
principle of legal ethics: the duty of competence.2 
Yet there is a line between readying witnesses for trial and coaching them in a 
way that perverts their testimony.  As the Supreme Court proclaimed more than 40 
years ago, “[a]n attorney must respect the important ethical distinction between 
discussing testimony and seeking improperly to influence it.”3  This boundary can 
be hard to discern.  And for prosecutors, the most powerful players in our criminal 
justice system, the inability to toe this line can lead to the conviction of innocent 
defendants.4 
At one end of the spectrum of impropriety, prosecutors may not counsel 
witnesses to testify falsely—despite incentives to occasionally do so.5  This 
conduct exposes the lawyer to possible disciplinary sanctions and jeopardizes the 
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1   DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 80 (2012). 
2   Id.  See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A 
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009). 
3   Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 90 n.3 (1976). As the New York Court of Appeals 
proclaimed more than a century ago, “[an attorney’s] duty is to extract the facts from witnesses, not 
pour them into him; to learn what the witness does know, not to teach him what he ought to know.” 
In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 171 (1880). 
4   See discussion of the Fernando Bermudez case infra notes 17–40. 
5   Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV., 829, 833–
34 (2002) (suggesting that prosecutors might coach witnesses with the aim of encouraging false 
testimony “primarily to (1) eliminate inconsistencies between a witness’s earlier statements and her 
present testimony, (2) avoid details that might embarrass the witness and weaken her testimony, and 
(3) conceal information that might reveal that the prosecutor has suppressed evidence”); see also id.
at 834–38 (elaborating on these incentives).
379 
380 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 16:379 
integrity of any subsequent conviction.6  Similarly, prosecutors may not push 
witnesses to testify a particular way, a technique known as “horseshedding” that 
dates back to the nineteenth century.7 
At the other end of the spectrum, it may be difficult to excise all traces of 
coaching from a witness preparation session.  It is not unusual for a witness to 
rehearse her direct testimony with an attorney before trial, especially if the witness 
is vulnerable or nervous about taking the stand.8  But these sessions provide 
openings to veer into dubious ethical territory.  A smile or nod by a prosecutor 
could convey to a witness that a fact warrants emphasis at trial.9  Likewise, a frown 
or shaking of the head could send the opposite message.  If that behavior occurs, 
has the prosecutor crossed the line?  Must a prosecutor offer no feedback 
whatsoever during a witness interview? 
Consider certain word choices and questioning methods too.10  Suppose a 
prosecutor asks a witness whether “the person you saw seemed drunk?”  Does the 
word “drunk” have a negative connotation that could taint the witness’s 
recollection of the event and prejudice any ensuing testimony?  The phrase 
“inebriated” or “intoxicated” might appear more neutral, but are prosecutors 
ethically required to use bland terminology? 
Bennett Gershman has thought deeply about these issues, as is his wont. 
Using his 2002 article on the topic of witness coaching as a launching pad,11 this 
article will take a renewed look at the ethics of witness preparation by prosecutors.  
This look is warranted because of what we now know about the role played by 
prosecutors in convicting innocent defendants, a phenomenon that was only 
6   The Supreme Court has held that the failure of prosecutors to correct the false testimony of 
a government witness, when they knew the testimony to be false, comprises a constitutional violation. 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 264 (1959).  This error, however, does not necessarily produce a 
reversal because of the harmless error doctrine.  See Andrew Cohen, Getting Away with Perjury: If a 
Witness Lies, Whose Job Is It To Say So?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/10/30/getting-away-with-perjury (June 27, 2018). 
7   This term was popularized by the novelist James Fenimore Cooper, who described how 
lawyers would prepare witnesses in carriage sheds near courthouses.  See Gershman, supra note 5, at 
829 n.5.  In the modern lexicon, observers sometimes use the phrase “woodshedding” (or simply 
“coaching”) to describe this behavior.  See MEDWED, supra note 1, at 80 n. 22. 
8   Smith v. Kelly, Civ. Action No. 7:07CV00536, 2008 WL 345838 *11 (W.D. Va. 2008) 
(“Rehearsing was especially appropriate in this situation where the witness was young, a rape victim, 
and mentally disabled.”). 
9   See Gershman, supra note 5, at 838–44 (describing the subtle ways in which preparation 
techniques can alter a witness’s recollection of an event and/or shape that witness’s future testimony). 
10  Id. at 842–43.  See also Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) (“For instance, the questioner’s choice of verbs to describe two cars coming into
contact (for example, “hit” vs. “smashed”) can influence the witness’s testimony about how fast the
cars were actually going.”).
11  See generally Gershman, supra note 5.  I will also draw on the work of other pioneering 
scholars.  See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, Witness Preparation: Regulating the Profession’s ‘Dirty 
Little Secret,” 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1007 (2011); Wydick, supra note 10. 
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beginning to surface at the time of Gershman’s piece.12  The National Registry of 
Exonerations, which compiles up-to-date statistics on wrongful convictions in the 
United States, documented 139 exonerations in 2017.  Of those cases, a record 
total—84—involved official misconduct, principally by police and prosecutors. 
More than half of those incidents occurred in homicide cases.13  Witness coaching 
is one of several types of prosecutorial errors that crop up in documented cases of 
wrongful conviction, in addition to failing to turn over exculpatory evidence and 
delivering improper closing arguments.14  Jailhouse informants and other 
cooperating witnesses who agree to testify in exchange for leniency, immunity, or 
a different benefit might be particularly susceptible to witness coaching because of 
the incentives to please prosecutors—and have testified in many wrongful 
conviction cases.15 
In Part II of the article, I elaborate on the manner in which witness preparation 
by prosecutors can morph into unethical behavior, highlighting the case of my 
former client Fernando Bermudez.  Next, in Part III, I analyze the assortment of 
ethical rules and standards that could apply to thwart witness coaching.  In Part IV, 
I entertain various reform proposals to curb this behavior in practice.  Professor 
Gershman has called witness coaching one of the “dirty secrets” of prosecutorial 
practice.16  I hope to continue in the Gershmanian tradition of bringing such secrets 
to light and striving to cleanse the profession of these tactics. 
II. FAILING FERNANDO
The case of Fernando Bermudez illustrates how flawed witness preparation 
and examination techniques by prosecutors can taint a trial and, when compounded 
by the failure to adequately disclose evidence of pretrial interviews, produce a 
miscarriage of justice.  The case revolved around a murder stemming from an 
altercation between two teenagers in New York City.  Specifically, one night in 
August 1991, an African American named Raymond Blount punched a sixteen-
12  As one reason for taking a closer look at witness preparation by prosecutors back in 2002, 
Gershman noted “there is an increasing concern—amply documented by recent reports of wrongful 
convictions—that the criminal justice system is seriously prone to error.” Gershman, supra, note 5 at 
832. 
13  Exonerations in 2017, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2018), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/ExonerationsIn2017.pdf. 
14  See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 461, 462 
(2017) (observing how recent attempts “to hold prosecutors more accountable” have been “fueled in 
part by the innocence movement, which has shown how prosecutorial misconduct leads to wrongful 
convictions . . .”).  See generally MEDWED, supra note 1.   
15  See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009). 
16  See Gershman, supra note 5, at 829 n. 2 (citing Roberta K. Flowers, What You See is What 
You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 740 
(1998)). 
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year old Puerto Rican, Ephraim “Shorty” Lopez, in the face at a nightclub.17 
Shortly thereafter Lopez approached another man, told him about the assault, and 
signaled in Blount’s direction.  Outside the club, the man asked Lopez to point out 
his assailant.  Lopez did.  The man then sidled up to Blount and shot him to death. 
Those events are largely undisputed.  The identity of the shooter, however, 
remained much in dispute for nearly two decades.18 
A presentation of the complete—and torturous—procedural history of the 
case exceeds the scope of this article.  Here are the highlights.  After the shooting, 
the police assembled a group of teenage eyewitnesses and asked them to provide a 
description of the shooter.  Based on that description, the detectives showed the 
witnesses a series of photographs.  In a bizarre procedure, the witnesses sorted 
through the pictures together.19  Ultimately, they identified the alleged shooter in a 
photo depicting Fernando Bermudez, a Dominican in his early twenties who went 
by the nickname “Most.”20 
The police then interviewed Lopez.  In several written statements, Lopez 
described the shooter as a Puerto Rican man from his neighborhood named Lou or 
“Wool” Lou (at the time “wool” was a term used for crack cocaine in cigarette 
form).21  Lopez later made a videotaped statement to New York County Assistant 
District Attorney James Rodriguez, reiterating that the shooter was known to him 
as Lou or “Wool” Lou and insisting he did not recognize the nickname “Most.”22  
Lopez even mentioned the name “Luis.”23  Nevertheless, Bermudez was charged 
with murder, and the case proceeded to a trial posture. 
Lopez’s statements were not disclosed to the defense until the eve of trial, far 
too late to permit Bermudez’s defense attorney to make much use of them to either 
17  See People v. Bermudez, No. 8759/91, 2009 WL 3823270, (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Nov. 9, 2009); 
See Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2015); MEDWED, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
18  MEDWED, supra note 1, at 82. 
19  Detectives [brought in seven witnesses, and] asked this group of witnesses 
collectively to describe the shooter.  The witnesses said he was a 16-to-26-year-old Hispanic 
man approximately 5′11″ and weighing around 165 pounds.  Detective Lentini then brought the 
witnesses several drawers’ worth of photographs of prior arrestees that matched this 
description.  The witnesses went through the photographs together while engaging in 
conversation with each other.  At one point, Velasquez took a photograph of Bermudez out of 
one of the drawers and showed this photograph to several other witnesses, remarking that 
Bermudez looked cute.  Velasquez gave the photograph of Bermudez to Detective Lentini, and 
the police officers immediately ended the procedure despite the fact that the witnesses had not 
yet looked through all of the photographs. 
Bermudez, 790 F.3d at 371. 
20  MEDWED, supra note 1, at 82. 
21  Id.; Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *3–6. 
22  See Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *3. 
23  Judge Cataldo observed that, “[h]aving reviewed the videotape of Mr. Lopez’s 
interrogation myself, I heard Mr. Lopez’s reference to Luis, although it was muffled and not easily 
discernable.  It could have been mistaken for another repetition of Lou.”  Id. at *7. 
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impeach Lopez on the stand or embark on a fact investigation.24  What is more, 
Lopez appeared at trial under a cooperation agreement that provided he would not 
be charged with a crime related to the shooting if he testified in the Bermudez 
case.25  And Lopez did cooperate, offering a narrative that only vaguely resembled 
his pretrial account.  Lopez identified Bermudez as the “Woolu” who committed 
the murder.  When asked directly by ADA Rodriguez whether he knew the 
shooter’s true name, Lopez denied it.  Rodriguez stayed mum—neglecting to 
correct the record, despite his involvement in the pretrial process in which Lopez 
labeled the shooter “Lou,” “Luis,” and “Wool Lou.”  It is fair to say that 
Rodriguez’s omission, coupled with the delayed disclosure of the pretrial 
statements, altered the course of the case by depriving the defense of access to a 
key lead about the identity of the actual perpetrator.  As Judge John Cataldo 
explained years later: 
[T]here was a substantial change in Mr. Lopez’s knowledge of the
shooter’s name between the time of the videotaped statement and his
subsequent trial testimony.  Initially the shooter had a name, Lou.  His
nickname was rationally explained.  Lou sold “wools,” a form of crack,
so they called him Wool Lou.  However, at trial the shooter became
Woolu.26
Armed with Lopez’s trial account, Rodriguez developed the argument that 
Bermudez was “Woolu,” a drug dealer who sold “wools” in a park on West 92nd 
Street in Manhattan near where Lopez lived.  In fact, Bermudez—again, of 
Dominican descent—lived with his family 100 blocks north of that location in the 
Inwood neighborhood.27  Apparently persuaded by the prosecution’s narrative, 
crafted through the testimony of Lopez and that of four other young eyewitnesses 
whose statements were tainted by the flawed identification procedures, the jury 
found Bermudez guilty of murdering Blount.28 
After the verdict, a private investigator hired by Bermudez’s family learned 
that Lopez had a friend, Luis Munoz, who went by the street name “Wool Lou” 
and had recently fled New York.  The investigator passed this information along to 
the police who, in turn, consulted with Rodriguez.  All the ADA did to pursue this 
avenue of investigation was obtain a copy of Munoz’s criminal history.29  On the 
cusp of sentencing, the defense team moved for a new trial based on Munoz’s 
possible involvement.  Unconvinced of the merits of this claim, in September 1992 
24  Id. at *6–7. 
25  Id. at *8. 
26  Id. at *6. 
27  Id. at *7–8. 
28  See Bermudez, 790 F.3d at 372. 
29  Id. 
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the judge denied the motion and sentenced Bermudez to a prison term of 23 years 
to life.30 
The case against Bermudez collapsed in the years after his incarceration.  For 
one thing, the teenage eyewitnesses who testified against him at trial each recanted 
their testimony.31  Even more, in 2007 the District Attorney’s investigator located 
and interviewed Munoz for the first time.  It turned out that Munoz not only had 
the nickname “Wool Lou” and left the jurisdiction right after the Blount murder, 
but also: (a) shared Lopez’s Puerto Rican heritage, (b) lived near Lopez’s 
grandmother, and (c) looked like Bermudez.32  These discoveries spurred 
prosecutors to concede that Munoz, not Bermudez, was the “Wool Lou” implicated 
in the shooting.33  Bermudez was freed in November 2009.34 
If during the trial, Assistant District Attorney Rodriguez had revealed Lopez’s 
prior references to “Lou,” “Luis” and “Wool Lou,” would the defense have found 
Munoz earlier and prevented a miscarriage of justice?  We will never know.  What 
we do know is that Judge John Cataldo overturned Bermudez’s conviction in part 
because of the failure of Rodriguez to correct Lopez’s false testimony—a misstep 
that violated the defendant’s right to due process of law.35 
I was a member of the legal team affiliated with the Second Look Program at 
Brooklyn Law School that worked on the Bermudez case in the early 2000s.  We 
lost a federal habeas corpus petition after a grueling evidentiary hearing and did 
not see a clear path forward to exoneration thereafter.36  Fortunately, another squad 
of attorneys had better vision. They succeeded by returning to state court and 
convincing Judge Cataldo of the problems with the conviction.37 
I have become friends with Bermudez since his release and often reflect on 
the horrors of his experience.  During those moments of reflection, I tend to dwell 
not on Efrain Lopez’s perjury, the tunnel vision exhibited by the police in homing 
in on Bermudez, the odd eyewitness identification procedure, or even the 
unconscionable delay in disclosing evidence of the pretrial interviews to the 
defense, all of which contributed to the tragedy.  Instead I focus on the actions of 
the trial prosecutor: James Rodriguez.  The record shows that he neglected to 
correct Lopez’s mistaken testimony, but that begs the question of how Lopez 
reached that stage.  What happened during the run-up to trial?  What exchanges 
occurred between Rodriguez and Lopez during the gap between his pretrial 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 373. 
32  See Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *6; MEDWED, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
33  See Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *8. 
34  See, e.g., John Eligon, Man Jailed for ’91 Murder Is Cleared by Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2009, at A23. 
35  See Bermudez, 2009 WL 3823270, at *15–16. 
36  See Bermudez v. Portuondo, No. 00-4795, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5427, at *139 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 29, 2004). 
37  See MEDWED, supra note 1, at 83. 
2019] COAXING, COUCHING AND COERCING 385 
interrogation and his trial appearance?  As noted above, Lopez testified under a 
cooperation agreement: an understanding he would not be charged with any crime 
related to the murder if he appeared for the prosecution.  Implicit in that 
arrangement was the idea that Lopez would testify against Bermudez.  To what 
extent did Rodriguez underscore that message during pretrial witness preparation 
sessions?38  Prosecutors typically examine potential cooperators quite rigorously 
before entering into an agreement in order to assess what they will say in court.39  
Was Lopez coaxed, coached, or coerced to omit any references to “Lou” or “Luis” 
on the stand? 
I admire the legal doctrine holding that prosecutors violate due process when 
they present testimony they know (or should know) is false.40  That principle can 
yield a new trial and rectify an injustice.  See Exhibit A, Fernando Bermudez.  In 
my remaining pages, though, I would like to explore a related issue.  How can we 
detect and prevent prosecutors from improperly influencing witnesses during 
pretrial preparation sessions and, in the process, helping to generate, inspire or 
validate that false testimony? 
III. THE ETHICAL REGIME GOVERNING WITNESS PREPARATION
Before analyzing how to detect and prevent witness coaching, it is important 
to discuss the array of ethics rules and standards that steer prosecutorial conduct in 
this area.  Even though the Supreme Court has admonished prosecutors to 
“respect” the ethical line between discussing testimony and improperly influencing 
38  As Gershman notes, “studies describe the distorting effect of suggestive questioning. 
Whereas witness preparation certainly can assist a witness in remembering and retrieving truthful 
recollection, preparation also can distort a witness’s underlying memory and produce a false 
recollection.”  Gershman, supra note 5, at 839.  See also Wydick, supra note 10, at 9–13. 
39  Ellen Yaroshefsky has described the process of developing a cooperation agreement in the 
federal system as follows: 
Once a defendant decides to enter the cooperation process, the defendant and her lawyer 
meet with government counsel and, typically, the agents involved in the case.  The initial 
debriefing gives the government a sense of whether the cooperator has useful 
information.  Depending upon the importance and strength of the case, the government 
may decide to meet with a defendant again even where it believes that the defendant has 
utterly lied.  Typically, there are a number of debriefing sessions prior to the government 
making a decision that the defendant should be signed up for a cooperation agreement. 
Once a cooperator obtains an agreement, his role varies by the nature of the case.  In most 
cases, the cooperator is expected to agree to testify and, if necessary, will spend 
considerable time with the assistant handling the case. 
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and 
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 930 (1999). 
40  The Supreme Court has held that the failure of prosecutors to correct the false testimony of 
a government witness, when they knew the testimony to be false, comprises a constitutional violation. 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).  See also People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557 (1956) 
(“A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the district 
attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.”). 
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it, the Court has neglected to map its boundaries, relegating this responsibility to 
the field of legal ethics.41  Many states have adopted large swaths of the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct in structuring their own 
ethics codes, so those provisions will form the basis of this discussion.42 
The Model Rules do not expressly cover witness preparation by prosecutors.43  
General concepts govern this topic instead.  All lawyers must engage in 
“competent” representation, which encompasses adequate preparation.44 In all their 
activities, including witness interviews, attorneys must avoid participating in 
“dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” as well as “conduct that is 
detrimental to the administration of justice.”45  These amorphous prohibitions are 
insufficient to grapple with the threat of witness coaching, especially situations 
where suggestive interview tactics produce false testimony that the prosecutor—let 
alone the judge or defense counsel—might not immediately recognize as 
fraudulent or detrimental to justice. 
Attorneys also may not “knowingly” present false or perjurious testimony, 
and lawyers are obliged to notify the tribunal when they become aware they have 
done so.46  The mental state of knowledge is a high bar, indicating that lawyers 
might not be held accountable under this provision if they are merely reckless or 
negligent in putting forth the flawed testimony.47  Beyond the ethical rules that 
guide all attorneys, only a few apply solely to prosecutors: most notably Rule 3.8, 
which covers the “special responsibilities of a prosecutor,” yet does not directly 
address witness preparation.48  Rather, the provisions are largely hortatory, urging 
prosecutors to embrace their minister-of-justice duty.49 
41  See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 90 (1976). 
42  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
43  Flowers, supra note 11, at 1010–16. 
44  Id. at 1010; see also ABA MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
45  See Flowers, supra note 11, at 1011–15; ABA MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
46  See Flowers, supra note 11, at 1011–12; ABA MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3–3.4 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
47  See Flowers, supra note 11, at 1012 (noting that “lawyers who unintentionally or 
unknowingly encourage false testimony may not be directly regulated by the ethical rules”). 
48  See generally Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Different Rules for Prosecutors, 31-
Fall CRIM. JUST. 3, 49 (2016). See also MEDWED, supra note 1, at 80–84 (discussing the ethical rules 
that govern prosecutorial examination and preparation of witnesses). 
49  I have written extensively about the minister-of-justice concept.  See, e.g., Daniel S. 
Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 125 (2004); Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 36 (2009).  In a recent article,
Eric Fish suggests that the “dual role” of prosecutors—that of advocate and minister of justice—
should be modified to emphasize the latter.  Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA 
L. REV. 1419, 1425 (2018).
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To be fair, one subsection of Rule 3.8 does require prosecutors to “make 
timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.”50  
This rule theoretically serves as a check on witness coaching, in the sense that 
prosecutors are obliged to turn over inconsistent or exculpatory witness statements 
as potential impeachment material that “tends to negate” the defendant’s guilt.  But 
in practice, without a separate rule requiring prosecutors to document pretrial 
witness statements, there may be nothing to disclose.  Worse yet, prosecutors may 
be incentivized to engage in plausible deniability and ignore any problems with 
witness statements that crop up during pretrial preparation sessions. 
Given the holes in the rules themselves, some scholars have looked to the 
ABA Criminal Justice Standards for guidance.51  Adopted a half century ago, the 
ABA Standards are “aspirational,” they do not carry the force of disciplinary 
rules.52  Even so, they offer insight into how the nation’s leading ethicists perceive 
of prosecutorial responsibilities—and how prosecutors should behave in an ideal 
world.  The standards applicable to the Prosecution Function were revised in 
2015,53 and contain a number of features that relate to witness preparation and 
examination. 
First, the Standards insist that prosecutors have a “heightened duty of 
candor.”54  The Standards also clarify that, in the context of witness testimony, 
“[t]he prosecutor should not offer evidence that the prosecutor does not reasonably 
believe to be true . . . When a prosecutor has reason to doubt the truth or accuracy 
of particular evidence, the prosecutor should take reasonable steps to determine 
that the evidence is reliable, or not present it.”55  If a prosecutor learns during a 
trial “that false evidence or testimony has been introduced by the prosecution, the 
50  ABA MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
51  ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (4th ed. 2015).  For 
an example of scholarship that looks to the Rules and Standards for guidance in evaluating 
constraints on prosecutorial behavior, see Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009). 
52  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 51, at Standard 3-1.1(c); Flowers, supra note 11, at 1012. 
53  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 51. 
54  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 51, at Standard 3-1.4(a).  What that means is: 
[t]he prosecutor should not make a statement of fact or law, or offer evidence, that the
prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be true, to a court, lawyer, witness, or third
party, except for lawfully authorized investigative purposes. In addition, while seeking to
accommodate legitimate confidentiality, safety or security concerns, a prosecutor should
correct a prosecutor’s representation of material fact or law that the prosecutor reasonably
believes is, or later learns was, false, and should disclose a material fact or facts when
necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent or criminal act or to avoid misleading a judge or
factfinder.
Id. at Standard 3-1.4(b). 
55  Id. at Standard 3-6.6(a). 
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prosecutor should take reasonable remedial steps.”56  The nature of those remedial 
steps varies depending on whether the witness is on the stand. 57 
Second, the Standards provide that a prosecutor may interview most routine 
government witnesses alone, i.e., without a “third party observer.”58  Yet “when 
the need for corroboration of an interview is reasonably anticipated, the prosecutor 
should be accompanied by another trusted and credible person during the 
interview.”59  In particular, “[t]he prosecutor should avoid being alone with any 
witness who the prosecutor reasonably believes has potential or actual criminal 
liability, or foreseeably hostile witnesses.”60 
Third, the Standards contain robust provisions that reinforce Rule 3.8(d)’s 
command that prosecutors disclose any material that tends to negate guilt.  The 
applicable Standards even go beyond the Rule to specify that a prosecutor 
“diligently seek to identify” this type of information that is “in the possession of 
the prosecution or its agents,”61 and that the duty to “identify, preserve, and 
disclose” this information is ongoing throughout the case.62  The Standards also 
offer an expansive vision of the material that must be disclosed, including 
information that tends to “impeach the government’s witnesses or evidence.”63 
Finally, the Standards impose a duty on prosecutors to report and respond to 
misconduct.  Office policy “should require internal reporting of reasonably 
suspected misconduct to supervisory staff within the office, and authorize 
supervisory staff to quickly address the allegations.”64  If a prosecutor believes a 
colleague is about to engage in misconduct, she should intervene and attempt to 
dissuade the person from doing so.  In the event such an effort falls short, that 
lawyer should report the colleague’s behavior to a “higher authority” in the office, 
even the chief prosecutor.65  If the chief prosecutor neglects to react appropriately, 
the lawyers should reveal the matter to figures outside the office.66 
The pertinent ABA Model Rules and Criminal Justice Standards strike the 
right chord overall, although they could be augmented.  At the turn of this century, 
the ABA embarked on a revision process to better align the Model Rules with their 
56  Id. at Standard 3-6.6(c). 
57  The Standards provide that “[i]f the witness is still on the stand, the prosecutor should 
attempt to correct the error through further examination.”  In contrast, “[i]f the falsity remains 
uncorrected or is not discovered until the witness is off the stand, the prosecutor should notify the 
court and opposing counsel for determination of an appropriate remedy.”  Id. 
58  Id. at Standard 3-3.4(f). 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. at Standard 3-5.4(a). 
62  Id. at Standard 3-5.4(b); See also id. at Standard 3-5.4(d). 
63  Id. at Standard 3-5.4(a). 
64  Id. at Standard 3-1.12(a). 
65  Id. at Standard 3-1.12(b). 
66  Id. at Standard 3-1.12(c). 
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state counterparts and grapple with unresolved questions.  As Niki Kuckes has 
noted, “[i]nsofar as prosecutorial ethics are concerned, however, the Ethics 2000 
process was a grave disappointment to many observers.”67  The ABA kept Rule 3.8 
intact despite serious pitfalls in its coverage.68  Amending ethics codes at the ABA 
and state levels—for instance, modifying the “knowledge” requirement to make it 
easier to sanction prosecutors for presenting false testimony—would serve as a 
step toward reducing witness coaching.69 
Even without further refinements, the disdain for unethical prosecutorial 
behavior rings through loud and clear in the existing rules and standards.  
Prosecutors, those erstwhile ministers of justices, have a higher burden of candor 
than the average lawyer whose actions lack the imprimatur of government 
approval and the capacity to punish people.  To their credit, the ethics rules seek to 
discourage prosecutors from presenting fraudulent testimony; encourage them to 
correct the record when their witnesses testify in a deceitful fashion; have third-
party observers in the room during preparation sessions with key witnesses; 
mandate the pretrial disclosure of information that tends to negate the defendant’s 
guilt; and trumpet the virtues of chief prosecutors who possess sound ethical 
compasses and monitor subordinates closely.70 
If these rules and standards were readily enforceable, they could help deter 
witness coaching by prosecutors on the front end or punish blatant violators on the 
back end.  James Rodriguez had better watch out.  But regrettably, that is not the 
case.  The standards on their own are toothless—they serve as guideposts, not 
requirements.  And, when it comes to the rules themselves, state disciplinary 
agencies seldom hold prosecutors accountable for clear violations.  Disciplinary 
actions against prosecutors comprise a tiny fraction of those filed against criminal 
defense lawyers and civil practitioners.71  Bar associations rarely even sanction 
prosecutors who are cited for misconduct in judicial opinions.  According to one 
study, only two prosecutors out of 326 convictions overturned on the grounds of 
official misconduct in Illinois eventually faced discipline.72  Prosecutorial offices 
67  Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 
GEO. J. L. ETHICS 427, 429 (2009). 
68  Id. at 429–30.  See also Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1573, 1586 (“Although [the Ethics 2000 Commission] added some explanatory comments and 
consolidated two of the existing disciplinary provisions of Rule 3.8, it made no substantive changes to 
these provisions, despite some discussion of doing so.  Nor did it identify any new prosecutorial 
obligations or restrictions.”). 
69  State reforms to prosecutorial ethics may offer more reason for optimism.  For instance, 
Massachusetts prohibits prosecutors from “intentionally avoid[ing] pursuit of evidence because the 
prosecutor believes it will damage the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.”  MASS. R. PROF.
CONDUCT R. 3.8(j).  See Kuckes, supra note 67, at 451–56 (discussing innovative state ethics rules). 
70  See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 51; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016). 
71  MEDWED, supra note 1, at 31. 
72  Id. at 31 n.109. 
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also are not known for their vigorous self-policing, especially in the absence of 
firm obligations to do so.73 
Therefore, while beefing up the ethics rules and standards that apply to 
prosecutors might marginally reduce improper witness preparation and 
examination, it is unlikely to have much impact without reimagining how 
disciplinary bodies and other regulatory actors operate.  Some scholars in the field, 
have expressed optimism about this possibility.  Bruce Green and Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, for instance, have detected a “regulatory shift” in which “[s]lowly 
and sporadically, courts and other regulators have become more receptive to 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, more inclined to initiate inquiries into 
these allegations, and somewhat more willing to afford remedies and impose 
punishment.”74 
But even if bar associations choose to enforce ethics rules more strictly 
against prosecutors, and courts become more vigilant, a fundamental problem 
would remain.  How can one detect missteps in an area of practice—witness 
preparation—that takes place in the interstices between formal appearances, often 
in secret and without any duty to memorialize the encounter, let alone record it 
accurately?  Indeed, as Gershman observed many years ago, solutions to witness 
coaching should target detection as well as prevention.75 
IV. REFORMS
With Gershman’s template in mind, I will now engage in a thought 
experiment about remedies geared toward detecting improper witness preparation 
and examination by prosecutors, then those aimed at prevention.  The two 
objectives are not mutually exclusive.  Enhanced detection will inevitably lead to 
greater prevention.  But dividing them in this manner represents a sound 
organizing principle, not to mention homage to Gershman. 
A. Detection
1. Pretrial Taint Hearings
Gershman has suggested that jurisdictions allow for pretrial hearings—or 
midstream hearings during a trial—in which a judge outside the presence of the 
jury evaluates witness interviews and determines whether a person’s testimony is 
“tainted” due to improper preparation techniques by the prosecutor.76  Such 
hearings are not uncommon when concerns are raised about potentially unreliable 
73  See infra notes 103–16. 
74  Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 51, 53 (2016). 
75  Gershman, supra note 5, at 851–59. 
76  Id. at 859–60. 
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evidence.77  Defense counsel could bear the responsibility of making a prima facie 
case about the need for a hearing, and in Gershman’s view the judge “should 
consider whether, under all the circumstances, the interview and preparation 
sessions give rise to a substantial likelihood of false, inaccurate or misleading 
testimony.”78 
This proposal holds promise, particularly with some tweaks.  Although it 
makes sense for defense attorneys to carry the initial burden, they might not be 
well-positioned to identify the tainted testimony.  Take the Bermudez case.  
Without ample time to scour through the records of the pretrial interviews, defense 
counsel was at a disadvantage in recognizing the significance of Lopez’s 
references to “Lou,” “Luis,” and “Wool Lou.”  Regardless of any discovery delays, 
defense attorneys usually do not interview every key prosecution witness 
beforehand,79 which would be the best method to pinpoint and counteract 
potentially deceitful testimony. 
I would recommend finding ways to motivate defense lawyers to interview 
critical prosecution witnesses prior to trial.80  That would bolster the quality of the 
defense performance in general, the ability of counsel to thwart improper 
preparation and examination tactics by prosecutors, and the chances of making out 
a prima facie case at a taint hearing.  As a backup measure, judges should have the 
power to order a taint hearing sua sponte, even absent a defense motion, say, when 
the judge’s past dealings with the particular prosecutor or witness have given her 
cause for concern. 
77  Id. at 859. 
78  Id. at 860.  See also MEDWED, supra note 1, at 84. 
79  For one thing, pretrial investigation by defense attorneys is often lackluster, and may 
involve only limited interviews with potential witnesses.  See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel and the Innocence Revolution: A Standards-Based Approach 226–45, in 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE 
INNOCENCE (Daniel S. Medwed, ed., 2017).  Even defense counsel keen on conducting a robust 
investigation might not be privy to the names of all the prosecution witnesses.  See, e.g., George C. 
Thomas, III, Two Windows into Innocence, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 575, 591 (2010) (“You might think 
that every jurisdiction requires the prosecution at least to tell the defendant who will testify against 
him.  But you would be wrong.  Twenty states and the federal government have no formal 
requirement that the prosecutor disclose his witness list.”).  Even when defense attorneys take the 
initiative to interview prosecution witnesses, they might be thwarted because the government has 
discouraged those witnesses from speaking with them. 
80  This issue is beyond the scope of this Article, although my instinct is that greater disclosure 
of prosecution witness lists, increased training of public defenders and funding for pretrial 
investigation could provoke defense counsel to engage in more extensive pretrial interviewing, 
provided there is the political will to allocate resources accordingly.  Courts could also be more 
vigilant in finding counsel ineffective for neglecting to conduct interviews.  For a discussion of 
certain litigation strategies aimed at encouraging effective assistance of counsel, see David 
Rudovsky, Gideon and The Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and The Reality, 32 LAW &
INEQ. 371 (2014). 
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2. Memorialization
Even if defense lawyers interview the chief prosecution witnesses before trial, 
they might not catch every inconsistency or dishonest statement.  Government 
witnesses understandably might be cagey, guarded or evasive during these 
sessions.  Statutory discovery rules and Supreme Court precedent help level the 
playing field by requiring that prosecutors disclose all pretrial witness statements 
prior to trial that could serve as fodder for impeachment on cross-examination.81 
But that presupposes prosecutors have actually documented those statements and 
kept them in the file.  And there is good reason to think that presupposition is 
wrong.  Neither prosecutors nor police are legally obliged to take notes.82  Rumors 
abound of office policies that discourage note-taking, in part to avoid creating 
impeachment material, or that generate notes in a form that escapes disclosure.83 
In light of this situation, a number of scholars have recommended that states 
require police and prosecutors to record every pretrial interview with a witness.84  
Those witness statements, in turn, should be discoverable by the defense as 
possible impeachment material.85  The type of memorialization envisioned under 
these proposals ranges from written transcription to audio or video recording.  
Video recording seems ideal, as it would capture subtle cues, like body language, 
that show whether coaching has occurred even without more explicit verbal 
indicators.86  To safeguard against the disclosure of sensitive and/or embarrassing 
information, courts could inspect the recordings and limit their use.87 
Robert Mosteller suggests that recording “first drafts” of conversations with 
witnesses is essential because it allows for the tracking of shifts in the witness’s 
account over time.88  But there are practical problems.  Must the police record 
81  See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 5, at 852 n. 117. 
82  In the absence of legislation or rules requiring that prosecutors record witness interviews, 
should judges take it upon themselves to encourage note-taking and/or seek disclosure of information 
about witness preparation sessions?  Former federal judge John Gleeson has discussed the pressures 
that judges face to supervise often young and inexperienced prosecutors.  See Hon. John Gleeson, 
Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 
5 J. L. & PUB. POL’Y  423 (1997). 
83  Id. at 452. 
84  See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 5, at 861–62; MEDWED, supra note 1, at 83–84; Robert P. 
Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents: Producing 
“First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 519, 560 (2009).
85  Mosteller is especially adamant about requiring memorialization for informants: people 
who cooperate with the government in exchange for some benefit.  See generally Mosteller, supra 
note 84.  See also Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors Be Required to Record Their Pretrial 
Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 257 (2005). 
86  Gershman, supra note 5, at 861–62. 
87  Id. at 862. 
88  See Mosteller, supra note 84, at 564–69. 
2019] COAXING, COUCHING AND COERCING 393 
every conversation as part of the investigative phase, long before a formal case 
takes shape?  Could such a rule give potential witnesses cold feet and yield fewer 
leads for law enforcement?89  These are legitimate questions, although the benefits 
of detecting witness coaching and clamping down on misleading testimony seem 
worth the cost. 
Given these concerns as well as political realities—fears about hamstringing 
police investigations too much—perhaps a compromise is fitting.  States could 
implement different recording requirements for the police as opposed to 
prosecutors considering they normally enter a case at different stages.  That is, 
require prosecutors to record all interviews with witnesses, while demanding that 
the police just take written notes.90  A risk of course is that the police notes may 
omit salient details and those omissions will be hard to catch. 
Another concern revolves around the consequences of failing to record an 
interview.  Suppose a prosecutor is required to record a witness interview but 
produces no tape during discovery and claims the machine malfunctioned.  Further 
assume there are no means of verifying this story.  What remedy, if any, is 
appropriate? 
An adverse inference instruction to the jury might be effective and serve as an 
incentive for prosecutors to comply with their duties.  These instructions convey 
that (a) a party to the action has not produced certain evidence, despite obligations 
to do so, and (b) the jury may infer that this evidence would have harmed the 
party’s case had it been presented.  One of the “‘oldest and most venerable 
remedies’ for spoliation,”91 adverse inference instructions are a popular tool to 
address the loss or destruction of evidence in federal court.92  According to Judge 
Shira Scheindlin and her law clerk Natalie Orr, these instructions “can serve 
multiple functions: punishing wrongful conduct, deterring future conduct, and 
restoring the adversary balance of the proceeding.”93  Restoration of the adversary 
balance is particularly apt in the witness preparation realm, an arena where the 
threat that prosecutors will dodge their recording obligations and engage in witness 
coaching undermines the capacity of counsel to mount a vigorous defense. 
At bottom, pretrial taint hearings and memorialization requirements could 
boost the odds that either defense counsel or the court will detect improper witness 
89  Id. at 565–66. 
90  One exception to this: I would recommend the videotaping of all police interrogations with 
those suspected of committing the crime so as to protect against “false confessions.”  See, e.g., Steven 
A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of
Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 619, 622–24 (2004).  In addition to recording “first drafts” of statements by
informants, Mosteller also proposes tweaks to note-taking requirements.  See Mosteller, supra note
84, at 566.
91  Shira A. Scheindlin & Natalie M. Orr, The Adverse Inference Instruction after Revised Rule 
37(E): An Evidence-Based Proposal, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2014). 
92  Id. See also Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 5176, 533 (Mass. 2004). 
93  Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 91, at 1300. 
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preparation by prosecutors.  And detection will likely deter prosecutors from 
witness coaching at the outset.  But if prevention is the main goal, then additional 
reforms are necessary. 
B. Prevention
1. Calling Out Wayward Prosecutors by Name
Prosecutorial misconduct can take many forms beyond witness coaching. 
Major categories of error include failing to disclose exculpatory evidence94 and 
making incendiary closing arguments.95  Even when those missteps lead to a 
reversal of a conviction,96 however, appellate courts hardly ever identify the 
culprits by name.  One study of forty-five federal convictions overturned due to 
improper prosecutorial summations found that appellate courts named the 
individual prosecutor at fault in only six opinions.97  Another study of 707 
documented prosecutorial misconduct cases in California determined that courts 
identified the prosecutors about 10 percent of the time.98 
Why do appellate courts afford such deference to prosecutors?  For one thing, 
it could be a matter of professional courtesy extended to quasi-judicial officers 
who must make tough decisions, choices that could be complicated by the prospect 
of having their mistakes broadcast publicly.  A less honorable explanation could be 
affinity.  Many judges are former prosecutors possibly inclined to give their 
successors the benefit of the doubt.99 
Whatever the reason, the hands-off approach taken by appellate judges to 
identifying individual perpetrators of prosecutorial misconduct does not impede 
(and may enable) this behavior.  Could the opposite tack—identifying individual 
prosecutors by name—diminish the rate of witness coaching?  Some prosecutors 
may anticipate future careers as defense lawyers.  Making an effective transition 
requires maintaining a good reputation in the criminal bar writ large or else 
94  See, e.g., Jason Kreag, The Jury’s Brady Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 345, 355–58 (2018). 
95  See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical 
Standards that Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 918-20 
(2011). 
96  MEDWED, supra note 1, at 109–10 (describing how the “harmless error doctrine” reduces 
the number of cases overturned on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct). 
97  MEDWED, supra note 1 at 111 (citing Paul J. Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in 
Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 119, 
169–70 (1999), 
https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=appellatepracticeprocess. 
98  Id. (citing KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009, 50 (2010), 
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir
=1&article=1001&context=ncippubs. 
99  Id. 
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referrals from and collaborations with defense attorneys will be few and far 
between.  Other prosecutors may envision a long-term stint in a district attorney’s 
office, conceivably with ambitions for higher political office.  Consider the old 
adage that “AG” stands for “Almost Governor.”100  These hopes for career 
advancement could be dashed by exposing their misconduct.  As an added bonus, 
outing misbehaving prosecutors in a public forum could spur disciplinary bodies to 
look more closely at what happened.101 
Assuming appellate courts remain reluctant to identify errant prosecutors, 
maybe another constituency should take on this task of “shaming by naming.”  
Adam Gershowitz has proposed that law schools establish “Prosecutor Misconduct 
Projects” in which law students cross-reference appellate opinions with trial 
transcripts in order to locate the names of prosecutors found to have committed 
misconduct.102  Armed with that information, the students could post the 
information online, highlighting repeat offenders.103  The existence of this treasure 
trove could aid courts in spotting repeat offenders and holding “recidivists” 
accountable.104 
To the best of my knowledge, no one has implemented Gershowitz’s idea on 
an institutional level.  Recall the name of the prosecutor in the Fernando Bermudez 
case.  Affixing a name to the conduct not only serves a deterrent purpose, but also 
humanizes the issue.  James Rodriguez—not some nameless, faceless prosecutor—
contributed to Bermudez’s wrongful conviction.  Even if prosecutorial decisions 
are influenced by institutional factors and systemic pressures, acts of misconduct 
are the byproduct of individual choices.  The key, then, is to craft reforms aimed at 
changing the prosecutorial decision-making calculus. 
2. Self-Policing by Prosecutors
Much of this article, and indeed much of the scholarship in this area, focuses 
on external solutions. These solutions aim to inspire courts, disciplinary agencies, 
defense lawyers, even law students to better regulate prosecutors and thereby 
prevent misconduct.  Yet several academics have extolled the virtues of internal 
100 See, e.g., Ben Wieder, Big Money Comes to State Attorney-General Races, THE ATLANTIC, 
(May 8, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/us-chamber-targets-dems-in-
state-attorney-general-races/361874/.  (“First, the joke is that ‘AG’ stands for ‘almost governor’ in 
the 43 states where they are elected, as many go on to higher elected office.”). 
101 MEDWED, supra note 1, at 115–16.  See also Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public 
Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
305, 305 (2016). 
102 Id. 
103 MEDWED, supra note 1, at 116. 
104 See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in 
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2086–2101 (2016) (describing how the collection of what 
Crespo calls “systemic facts” can allow for better monitoring and regulation of prosecutors). 
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oversight by prosecutors themselves.105  The argument for internal regulation goes 
something like this.  First, most prosecutors want to do the right thing and achieve 
justice.  Second, prosecutors are in the best position to oversee and modify their 
activities to realize the justice ideal because most of their decisions occur behind-
the-scenes where they alone enjoy access.  Third, individual line prosecutors might 
respond more favorably to their peers, and to the objective of upholding office 
values, than to the demands of outsiders.106  We have seen positive instances of 
self-regulation.  Some prosecutors’ offices have instituted controls to restrain 
attorney behavior, such as layers of supervision, training programs and disciplinary 
processes;107 adopted higher evidentiary thresholds for charging cases than those 
contained in the rules of ethics;108 volunteered to engage in “open file” discovery 
practices;109 set up internal review committees to evaluate the reliability of 
jailhouse informants110 and eyewitnesses;111 and formed post-conviction innocence 
units devoted to ferreting out potential wrongful convictions in their 
jurisdictions.112 
I applaud prosecutor offices that have taken regulatory steps to encourage best 
practices and identify the bad ones, especially those that combat unconscious 
biases.  The academic literature has examined how cognitive biases can shape 
decisions made by even well-meaning prosecutors.113  Tunnel vision—or in 
105 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (2012).  For a discussion of the possible benefits of internal regulation in the
context of disclosure duties under Brady v. Maryland, see Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword, New
Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1943 (2010); Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of
the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2011–29 (2010); Daniel S.
Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1551–53 (2010).
106 For a prominent article trumpeting the benefits of internal regulation by prosecutors, See 
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008) (“We believe 
that the internal office policies and practices of thoughtful chief prosecutors can produce the 
predictable and consistent choices, respectful of statutory and doctrinal constraints, that lawyers 
expect from traditional legal regulation.  Indeed, we believe that internal regulation can deliver even 
more than advocates of external regulation could hope to achieve.”). 
107 MEDWED, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
108 Id. 
109 See id. at 46–47. 
110 See id. at 90–91. 
111 See id. at 29 n. 100. 
112 See, e.g., Daniel Kroepsch, Current Development, Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees 
and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal Programs are Fulfilling the Prosecutor’s Duty to Serve 
Justice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095 (2016). 
113 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Alafair S. Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive 
Bias, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006); Dianne L. Martin, 
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scholarly parlance the “expectancy or confirmation bias”114—can lead prosecutors 
to latch onto a particular theory of a case and cling to it even in the face of 
contradictory evidence, a phenomenon known as “belief perseverance.”115  Studies 
indicate that setting up internal training workshops and systems of checks and 
balances can counteract these biases.  One example is to ask prosecutors to 
articulate the reasons for a decision to other people and then produce counter-
arguments during a role-playing exercise.116 
But I am mindful of the limitations of self-policing.  They include the risk that 
internal regulation will be viewed as a panacea to the various ills associated with 
prosecutorial decision-making and the difficulties in enforcing self-imposed norms 
of behavior.117 Unlike many civil law countries, the United States lacks a 
prosecutorial culture of “tight bureaucratic controls.”118  Without any mechanism 
for outsiders to monitor the effectiveness of internal regulation, much less a means 
of enforcement, it may be impossible to gauge whether self-policing measures 
work.  That said, internal regulation could curb some witness coaching—provided 
that defense lawyers, judges, and observers remain skeptical about prosecutorial 
claims that their houses are in order.  
3. Carrots
In this article, I have emphasized reforms designed to expose, regulate, and/or 
punish unethical prosecutors: an assortment of “sticks,” so to speak, to beat back 
misconduct.  Alafair Burke has noted that I, along with others in the field, 
occasionally lapse into the “language of fault,” rhetoric that may go unheard by 
prosecutors.119  It is a valid point.  Assigning blame overlooks how the realities of 
the prosecutorial enterprise can prompt good people to make bad choices.  
Prosecutors are often overworked and underpaid, with incentives to process cases 
Lessons about Justice from the “Laboratory” of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the 
Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence,” 70 UMKC L. REV. 847 (2002). 
114 See generally Findley & Scott, supra note 111. 
115 See MEDWED, supra note 1, at 22 n. 54. 
116 Id. at 25. 
117 Id. at 30–31 (describing flaws of internal discipline), id. at 47–48 (discussing problems 
with “open file” discovery). 
118 Ronald F. Wright, Reinventing American Prosecution Systems, 46 CRIME & JUST. 395, 
402–03 (2017) (noting that “internal bureaucratic tools—training, articulated standards, and internal 
review of recorded individual decisions—all strengthen the concept of the prosecutor's job as a 
neutral quasi-judicial officer.  The end result, in theory, produces prosecutorial decisions that are 
more consistent with one another and more consistent with the values embodied in the criminal 
code.”).  In contrast, “[i]n the United States, the archetypal role of a prosecutor rejects the apolitical, 
bureaucratic concept of the role found elsewhere in the world.”  Id. 
119 Alafair Burke, Prosecution (Is) Complex, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 703, 715–16 (2013). 
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quickly and obtain a high conviction rate.120  Few enter this line of work with the 
ambition of acting unethically, and instead seek the intangible rewards of 
preserving public safety, vindicating the interests of victims, and other noble 
objectives.121  In line with this logic, many prosecutors who make unethical 
decisions do so inadvertently, drawn astray by a blend of practical, professional 
and psychological factors.122 
Stephanos Bibas has floated some potential “carrots” aimed at encouraging 
prosecutors to fulfill the minister-of-justice goal.  He suggests chief prosecutors 
should de-emphasize the importance of gaining convictions, and in the process 
remove incentives to take shortcuts and/or cross ethical boundaries to “win” cases. 
He advises a variety of techniques: 
1. Tout the concept of doing justice;
2. Praise line assistants who dismiss cases due to insufficient evidence;
3. Award promotions for reasons other than high conviction rates; and
4. Give clout to internal ethics gurus who are expected to guide other
prosecutors.123
Offices could also formally recognize prosecutors who excel during internal 
training programs, for instance, regarding non-suggestive interviewing tactics.124  
These proposals all have merit.  Instilling a culture of honest and diligent behavior 
within prosecutors’ offices would go a long way toward preventing witness 
coaching, especially in conjunction with a handful of sticks wielded internally and 
externally. 
V. CONCLUSION
Bennett Gershman’s article on witness coaching is just one example of his 
groundbreaking scholarship.  His proposals have stood the test of time.  Although 
it may be cold comfort to Fernando Bermudez, implementing the reforms raised in 
this article could better detect and prevent improper witness preparation and 
examination in the future. Ideally, these changes could dissuade prosecutors from 
behaving as James Rodriguez did so many years ago, a singular example of 
unethical behavior that provides a window into what is likely a larger problem that 
lurks in the opaque corners of the criminal justice system. 
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